Effective Altruism

Effective altruism is a growing social movement based around the idea of using evidence and reason to work out how best to make the world a better place. About effective altruism

Some charities are far more effective. As Peter Singer says in his TED presentation, a guide dog costs $40,000, while ensuring someone doesn't become blind because of a preventable disease, as little as $20-50:

This kind of thinking makes people very uncomfortable, which leads to terrible critiques. One doesn't have to be Spock to think it more effective to save 800 to 2000 people from blindness than training a guide dog.

EAs are not above critique, and good ones should actually improve their behaviour: as you would expect with rationalists. Even non-Vulcan ones!

I have some cognitive dissonance with regards to EA. Take the Against Malaria Foundation. I thought it was shown that selling the nets was more cost effective than giving them; but a market-driven approach doesn't feel very altruistic. It also seems as though there's too much emphasis on exploitation over exploration and an over-confidence in their estimates, suggesting a portfolio approach would be more effective.

A lack of emphasis on environmental issues is rather puzzling given how much EAs tend to worry about X-risks.

This suggests that the next frontier for EAs will be building better models. Accepting measures such as disability-adjusted life-years creates a de facto implicit model, one in which an intervention that gave you an extra 10 years with a disability would never be as good as another that extended your healthy life just a single day. Such a ridiculous utility function probably doesn't matter when making a first pass, but we get what we measure; if EAs succeed to shifting people's charitable giving habits, we could quickly be making these kinds of perverse optimizations.

Don't let those critiques deter you from learning more about giving more effectively and researching charities to see which ones do the most good.

6 responses
> Take the Against Malaria Foundation. I thought it was shown that selling the nets was more cost effective than giving them; but a market-driven approach doesn't feel very altruistic. It also seems as though there's too much emphasis on exploitation over exploration and an over-confidence in their estimates, suggesting a portfolio approach would be more effective. GiveWell discusses this here: http://www.givewell.org/international/technical... They really are remarkably thorough! > A lack of emphasis on environmental issues is rather puzzling given how much EAs tend to worry about X-risks. I'm curious about this too. I think there are a couple of factors: 1. Extinction risks from climate change appear to be pretty small. We know that climate change will do a bunch of damage, but it looks to be quite survivable. 2. There are already many people worried about environmental issues. It doesn't appear as under-resourced as, say, neglected tropical diseases. 3. Many environmentalists have a mentality that the environment is sacred, i.e. it's a value that you're not allowed to trade off against (much like standard discourse in the U.S. professes that life is a sacred value, though according to our revealed preferences this isn't the case). > This suggests that the next frontier for EAs will be building better models. Accepting measures such as disability-adjusted life-years creates a de facto implicit model, one in which an intervention that gave you an extra 10 years with a disability would never be as good as another that extended your healthy life just a single day. Such a ridiculous utility function probably doesn't matter when making a first pass, but we get what we measure; if EAs succeed to shifting people's charitable giving habits, we could quickly be making these kinds of perverse optimizations. I'm not sure what reasoning leads to DALYs inducing such a weird utility function. That said, for what it's worth, I think their cousin QALYs are a better metric, and (modulo issues with measurement) capture pretty much what I value about saving lives: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QALY Unfortunately , assessing even global health charities according to relatively simplistic QALY/DALY models seems to be barely tractable and fairly unreliable: http://blog.givewell.org/2011/08/18/why-we-cant... For this reason, I think that the best advances will not be in devising better models, but better epistemology. Getting better at truth-seeking seems to me to be higher-return than getting better at figuring out our values.
The studies they cite all predate this post by the Acumen fund: http://acumen.org/blog/news/more-than-one-appro... Given they produce tens of millions of LLINs per year and that they arranged for that technology transfer to Africa ( http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/20... ), I would have a fairly high prior for them knowing what they're doing.
("A posthaven user"? You'd think being logged in would let me use my name. Silly posthaven) re: environment, the catastrophe scenario would not cause an extinction. Hundreds of millions of deaths and as many climate refugees could cause a crisis that makes it next to impossible to work on any longer-term X-risks. While lots of activists are working on the issue, many are pushing in precisely the wrong direction. re: DALY or QALY, compare these two interventions: -an extra 10 years with a disability -a single year of life Under a DALY calculation, it's 10 years of life with disability vs 9 years of life lost, so the better intervention is the one that gives us an extra year of life without disability. This is of course preposterous, and a reason to use a QALY, which would give a saner result assuming any discount factor above 0.1. Assuming a disability is only 10% as good as a healthy life, those two options would be equivalent. The discussion of creating those discount factors is a whole other can of worms. Still, let's assume GiveWell researches a thousand charities and ranks them. That list would be very different depending on the use of DALYs or QALYs as a metric. Using the DALY list would mean systematically privileging charities that result in shorter healthy lives. (These metrics will also naturally privilege youth. Interventions to save 50 year olds, no matter the metric, will generally seem half as effective as saving a child. This can cause a problem for political stability and cultural transmission.) I think we reach a similar conclusion; we need to get better at truth seeking - I mean to use "models" as a tool to zero in on uncertainties, not simply a tool to direct behaviour. Forcing myself to model things I thought I understood revealed huge gaps in logic and knowledge. A sensitivity analysis on GiveWell's cost spreadsheets would reveal the most important parameters that determine the cost-effectiveness of interventions against Malaria: that's a good place to focus research efforts. I'm curious as to how you want to go about being better at truth-seeking.
> The studies they cite all predate this post by the Acumen fund: http://acumen.org/blog/news/more-than-one-appro... > > Given they produce tens of millions of LLINs per year and that they arranged for that technology transfer to Africa ( http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/20... ), I would have a fairly high prior for them knowing what they're doing. More worrying to me is that GiveWell's cited studies also directly contradict The Acumen Fund's findings: > A program distributing nets at prenatal clinics in Kenya found that increased prices (from $0 to $0.75, the price at which they were sold) reduced demand by approximately 75%, but were not associated with higher rates of utilization. vs. > A large majority of people would willingly pay up to $1.50 per net, especially once they understand product efficacy. My guess is that something funky is going on with "especially once they understand product efficacy", but I'm not sure. Why don't we ask GiveWell? They're usually quite responsive and I'd be interested to see their answer. > re: environment, the catastrophe scenario would not cause an extinction. Hundreds of millions of deaths and as many climate refugees could cause a crisis that makes it next to impossible to work on any longer-term X-risks. My impression (and I haven't done very thorough research) is that in most projections, costs of global warming don't go over 5% of world GDP. This is certainly a crisis (to the tune of trillions of dollars a year!) but not one that would make it "next to impossible" to work on anything else. For instance, the US output would be less harmed by global warming than by every citizen of New York City switching to work full-time on climate change mitigation. Anyway, I agree that it merits looking into, and in fact GiveWell is looking into it. I'm just trying to illustrate that it's not a priori clearly more effective than e.g. the other things GiveWell is looking into. > While lots of activists are working on the issue, many are pushing in precisely the wrong direction. Yes, I agree on this. (That's why I said "appears to be less under-resourced" rather than "is", but in retrospect I should have been clearer.) I actually have conversation notes in the works on effective environmental activism that touches on this--I'll post them soon, but they're awaiting final revision. > Under a DALY calculation, it's 10 years of life with disability vs 9 years of life lost, so the better intervention is the one that gives us an extra year of life without disability. This is of course preposterous, and a reason to use a QALY, which would give a saner result assuming any discount factor above 0.1. Assuming a disability is only 10% as good as a healthy life, those two options would be equivalent. You seem to be assuming that DALYs somehow don't have a disability weight. But they do: http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_dis... Are you using a different definition from the WHO's? Can you either link me to that definition, or tell me the actual numbers you're plugging into the WHO's?
I've asked GiveWell and Acumen in a tweet: https://twitter.com/danielharan/status/40725363... On climate change, a 5% economic impact even if accurate, still masks larger issues - besides discounting the economic output of poorer countries that will bear most of the costs. I specifically mentioned the problem of environmental refugees. What happens to international stability when hundreds of millions of people are refugees, whether internal or across national borders? After typhoon Haiyan, 1.9 million were displaced in the Philippines alone, probably far fewer than had to migrate inside China because of encroaching deserts. Environmental refugees sometimes appear as economic ones, and economically productive people are the first to migrate, leaving economically crippled areas behind them and then stressing the capacity of host cities or slums. There are other concerns for systemic stability in cases of resource conflicts. Water is often mentioned; it is needed for food as well as thermal power generation plants. This has already impacted the US: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/30/us-co... Disease vectors and exotic species are also moving out of their normal zones, affecting health care costs and agricultural output. There's no way economic forecasts of 5% reflect all these risks, or the possibility of conflict. While our governance systems will be dealing with this, they won't be doing much else. As for the DALY / QALY issue, I was using Wikipedia. Re-reading the DALY article, I noticed they explicitly weigh young people as more important - the measure actually reflects economic output potential. Ick. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjuste... I have a strong distrust for any unique measure of progress as many things I value are not fungible. I believe we make much better decision when we are explicit about the trade-offs.